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                            ----------  
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Defendant Arthur Turcks was convicted on each count of a 
nineteen-count indictment, charging conspiracy, credit card fraud 
and bank fraud.  On appeal, Turcks contests the jury 
instructions, the failure to merge the nine counts of "access 
device" fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), into one offense, and the 
district court's restitution order. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because 
Turcks did not object to any of the district court's rulings, we 
review for "plain error".1  Although we find no "plain error" in 
the jury instructions or with respect to the multiplicity of 
counts, the restitution ordered by the district court was not 
supported by the necessary fact-finding as required by United 
States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 1994 WL 
466503 (Nov. 7, 1994).  Hence we affirm the district court's 
rulings in all matters other than its restitution order.  As to 
the portion of the district court's sentence affecting 
restitution, we reverse and remand for appropriate fact-finding 
and a redetermination of the restitution order.  
                     
1
.  Counsel on appeal was not trial counsel. 
  
    I 
 Arthur Turcks and co-defendant Earl Warfield were co-owners 
of the Lansdowne Video Store in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  On 
May 27, 1992, a federal grand jury returned a nineteen count 
indictment against Turcks and Warfield.2 
 Count One charged Turcks and Warfield with conspiring to 
commit credit card fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2).3  
Counts Two through Ten charged Turcks with access device fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2).4 Counts Eleven through 
Nineteen charged Turcks with bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1344.5  These charges all arose from the use of lost or stolen 
                     
2
.  Warfield was also convicted of nineteen counts of access 
device fraud but did not appeal.  Opinion of the District Court, 
Nov. 20, 1992, p. 1. 
3
.  Section 1029(b)(2) provides as follows: 
 
 Whoever is a party to a conspiracy of two or more persons to 
commit an offense under subsection (a) of this section, if 
any of the parties engages in any conduct in furtherance of 
such offense, shall be fined an amount not greater than the 
amount provided as the maximum fine for such offender under 
subsection (c) of this section or imprisoned not longer than 
one-half the period provided as the maximum imprisonment for 
such offense under subsection (c) of this section, or both. 
4
.  Section 1029 provides as follows: 
 
 (a) Whoever-- 
 
  (2) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics in or 
uses one or more unauthorized access devices during any one-
year period, and by such conduct obtains anything of value 
aggregating $1,000 or more during that period; . . . 
 
 shall, if the offense affects foreign or interstate 
commerce, be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this 
section. 
5
.  Section 1344 provides as follows: 
  
credit cards to consummate fraudulent retail sales between 
February 1989 and February 1990. 
 At trial, the government adduced evidence that, in the 
operation of the Lansdowne Video store, lost or stolen credit 
cards were fraudulently used to complete purported retail sales.  
In the thirteen months prior to January 1989, Lansdowne Video had 
recorded $6,394.00 in credit card sales.  In the thirteen months 
following January 1989, Lansdowne Video recorded $97,794.08 in 
credit card sales.  Only Turcks and Warfield had access to the 
store's credit card processing machines and at least one of them 
was present whenever the store was open. 
 A handwriting expert testified, using handwriting exemplars, 
that Turcks had probably signed four of the invalid credit card 
sales slips which were charged to four separate credit card 
accounts.  The government had placed in evidence the fraudulent 
credit card slips and the handwriting exemplars from both 
defendants. 
(..continued) 
 
 Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme 
or artifice-- 
 
  (1)  to defraud a financial institution;  or 
 
  (2)  to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, 
assets, securities, or other property owned by, or 
under the custody or control of, a financial 
institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises; 
 
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more 
than 30 years, or both.   
  
 When defendants opened their credit card merchant account, 
they agreed to process each customer's card through an 
authorization device and to comply with any instructions or 
authorizations received.  Bank records demonstrated that numerous 
transactions initiated at Lansdowne Video were rejected with 
instructions to call the bank but no calls were ever made.  
Indeed, in many instances, cards were "worked" or processed 
seeking lesser and lesser amounts in an attempt to obtain an 
authorization despite prior denials.   
 The credit slips derived from these fraudulent transactions 
were deposited in Lansdowne's merchant banking account at Mellon 
Bank.  Turcks signed many of the deposit slips which reflected 
the deposit of fraudulent credit slips. 
 By means of these fraudulent procedures, Lansdowne Video 
generated $102,137.99 in illegal credit card transactions.  
Apparently however some of the credit card transactions were 
never processed to completion.  This circumstance may have given 
rise to the probation department's subsequent reduction in the 
calculation of the loss. 
 At the close of the trial, the district court, without 
objection, charged the jury on the substantive counts of the 
indictment as follows:  
A person may be guilty of a crime on one or more of 
three different bases.  First, a person is guilty if 
the person himself or herself committed the crime, that 
is actually perpetrated the crime.  Second, a person is 
guilty as a co-conspirator if the person was a member 
of the conspiracy when the crime was committed, and if 
it was committed in furtherance of or as a foreseeable 
consequence of the conspiracy.  Third, a person is 
guilty of a crime committed by someone else if the 
  
person aids and abets the commission of the 
crime. . . . 
 
 If any one or more of these three bases is shown 
by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that is that 
the person was the actual perpetrator of the crime, 
that the person was responsible as a co-conspirator, or 
that the person was an aider or abetter, the person may 
be found guilty of the crime charged.  
 
App. 46a-47a.  The jury convicted Turcks on all nineteen counts 
in a general verdict. 
 At a March 4, 1993 hearing, the district court sentenced 
Turcks to twenty-five months imprisonment from a range of twenty-
one to twenty-seven months, followed by three years supervised 
release.  Despite indications that Turcks was insolvent, the 
district court, without determining the extent of his financial 
ability to pay or his future needs, ordered Turcks to pay 
$102,137.99 in restitution to the defrauded banks.  The 
$102,137.99 figure was derived from the presentence report.  The 
district court did not make findings reflecting the basis for 
this amount, or to whom the monies should be paid, or the 
relationship between the restitution imposed and the loss caused 
by Turcks' conduct.  The district court also ordered Turcks to 
pay $950 in Special Assessments.   
 Despite the district court's oral sentence, the judgment 
that was entered thereafter ordered Turcks to pay only $85,835.99 
to twenty-one named banks and attributed the entire amount of the 
restitution order to Count Two.  The $16,298 difference between 
the amount initially ordered by the district court and the amount 
  
recorded in the written judgment apparently resulted from later 
calculations made by the probation department. 
 Turcks filed an untimely appeal, but sought and received an 
order finding excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(b). 
 
II 
 Turcks challenges the jury instructions given by the 
district court.  He contends that the district court erroneously 
charged the elements of co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), and that, as a result, the 
jury convicted him improperly. 
 
A. 
 Because Turcks did not object to the challenged instruction, 
we will reverse only if we find "plain error."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
Rule 52(b)6; United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1228 (3d Cir. 
1994).  The Supreme Court has stated that, "[i]t is the rare case 
in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a 
criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial 
court."  Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). 
 For "plain error" to exist: 
There must be an "error" that is "plain" and that 
"affect[s] substantial rights."  Moreover, Rule 52(b) 
                     
6
.  Rule 52(b) reads as follows: 
 
 Plain Error.  Plain errors or defects affecting substantial 
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the 
attention of the court. 
  
leaves the decision to correct the forfeited error 
within the sound discretion of the Court of Appeals, 
and the court should not exercise that discretion 
unless the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness , 
integrity or public reputation of the judicial 
proceedings." 
 
United States v. Olano, __ U.S. __, __, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 
(1993) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)). 
 A deviation from a legal rule is error.  Olano, 113 S. Ct. 
at 1777.  A "plain" error is "clear" or "obvious."  Id.  In most 
cases, an error will be deemed to have "affected substantial 
rights" where it is prejudicial.  Prejudicial error, affecting 
substantial rights, must have "affected the outcome of the 
District Court proceedings."  Id. at 1778. 
 When these elements are met, "the Court of Appeals has 
authority to order correction, but is not required to do so."  
Id.  We will exercise our discretion "where the defendant is 
actually innocent, or where, regardless of the defendant's 
innocence or guilt, the error `seriously affect[s] the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'"  United 
States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1229 (quoting Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 
1779). 
 
B. 
 The government concedes that the district court's 
instruction was erroneous and obvious.  Under Pinkerton v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), and pursuant to our jurisprudence, a 
jury must find that a party to the conspiracy committed a crime 
both "in furtherance of" and "as a foreseeable consequence of" 
  
the conspiracy to find a co-conspirator guilty of a substantive 
offense committed by a co-conspirator.  Id. at 646; United States 
v. Gonzales, 918 F.2d 1129, 1135-36 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 1637 (1991).  Thus, the district court should have 
charged the jury in the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive, 
using "and" instead of "or" in its instruction.  As noted 
earlier, the district court charged "a person is guilty as a co-
conspirator for the crimes committed by another co-conspirator if 
the person was a member of the conspiracy when the crime was 
committed, and it was committed in furtherance of or as a 
foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy."  App. 46a (emphasis 
added).  By charging in the disjunctive, the district court 
clearly erred.  Therefore, the first two elements of "plain 
error" are met.  We turn then to the third element of the "plain 
error" analysis -- prejudice. 
 We conclude that Turcks was not prejudiced by this error.  
Prejudice results if the error "affected the outcome of the 
District Court proceedings."  Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1778.  The 
inquiry concerning prejudice on "plain error" review is similar 
to our inquiry into harmless error with the important difference 
that the defendant, rather than the government, bears the burden 
of persuasion in a "plain error" analysis.  Id.  
 In harmless error analysis, where the burden rests on the 
government, we reverse unless the government can show "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained."  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967).  "To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict 
  
is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything 
else the jury considered on the issue in question as revealed in 
the record."  Yates v. Evatt, -- U.S. --, --, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 
1893 (1991).  "The inquiry . . . is not whether, in a trial that 
occurred without error, a guilty verdict would surely have been 
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in 
this trial was surely unattributable to the error."  Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, -- U.S. --, --, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993) (emphasis 
in original).   
 Because the burden of establishing prejudice is a burden 
that Turcks bears, we will reverse only if Turcks can show that 
the erroneous charge actually affected the jury's verdict in his 
case.  See United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d at 1232.   To meet 
his burden, Turcks argues that the jury could have considered the 
evidence implicating him in the conspiracy and found him guilty 
of conspiracy.  Turcks then contends that the jury could have 
proceeded to analyze his guilt on the substantive offenses based 
on the district court's erroneous instruction that permitted his 
conviction on proof of either "furtherance" or "foreseeability" 
but not both.  Turcks cites Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. --
, 112 S. Ct. 466 (1991), for the proposition that the possibility 
that the jury rested its general verdict on the one improper 
theory among multiple proper theories requires reversal.   
 In Griffin, however, reversal was sought because the 
evidence did not support one of the two theories presented to the 
jury in the charge.  Id. at 468.  The Court rejected Griffin's 
assertion that where the jury is given two alternative grounds 
  
for conviction and the evidence is insufficient to support one 
ground, the error cannot be harmless.  Id. at 474.  In doing so, 
however, the Court continued to acknowledge the principle that an 
error in defining the law that applies to one of multiple 
theories (the "impossible to tell" concept), as distinct from a 
challenge based on insufficient evidence, requires reversal of a 
general verdict conviction.  Id. at 470-71, 474; see also Yates 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
 Neither Yates nor Griffin, however, were premised on a 
"plain error" analysis--the analysis we must employ on this 
appeal.  Under "plain error," the burden that the defendant must 
meet to satisfy the "prejudice" requirement is to show that the 
outcome of his trial was actually affected.  Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 
1778. 
 The Seventh Circuit recently discussed the relationship 
between harmless error and "plain error" in the context of jury 
instructions in United States v. McKinney, 954 F.2d 471 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 662 (1992).  At McKinney's trial 
for conspiracy, the court instructed the jury that any one of 
four possible overt acts could justify a conviction for 
conspiracy.  One of the instructed acts was not a proper ground 
for a conspiracy conviction.  Id. at 474-75.  While the court 
recognized that instructing on the improper ground was not 
"harmless error," it also concluded that it was not "plain error" 
because McKinney was unable to show that the jury convicted him 
based on the improperly instructed element: 
  
Where an alleged error is deemed to violate the 
Constitution (as in this case), an error is harmless 
only if the appellate court can find that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .  Moreover, 
the government must demonstrate that the error was 
harmless; a defendant need not affirmatively show harm.  
Plain error, on the other hand, is an error so grievous 
that it caused an actual miscarriage of justice, which 
implies that the defendant probably would not have been 
convicted absent the error. 
 
Id. at 475-76 (citations omitted).  The court held, "it is not 
probable that the jury convicted McKinney solely on the basis of 
the fourth [improper] alleged overt act.  Thus, submitting that 
act to the jury was not plain error."  Id. at 477. 
 Turcks has not shown us that the jury likely convicted him 
of access device fraud on the basis of the erroneous Pinkerton 
charge.  The jury heard the Pinkerton charge only once.  It did 
not have a copy of the charge in the jury room.  The government 
did not discuss Pinkerton liability in its summation.  Nor did 
Turcks' counsel, in his summation, discuss co-conspirator 
liability.  Moreover, as we have related earlier, the error 
giving rise to this issue on appeal stemmed from the unfortunate 
use of one word:  "or" instead of "and," in a lengthy, otherwise 
unassailable, charge.  There is little question in our minds but 
that if counsel had called the district court's attention to what 
we perceive as no more than an inadvertent mistake, the district 
court would have promptly cured its error. 
 Further, the weight of the evidence presented at trial 
established that Turcks committed the offenses charged and that 
he aided and abetted Warfield's illegal use of the credit cards.  
Only Turcks and Warfield were trained and authorized to accept 
  
credit cards.  The fraudulent credit slips bore two different 
styles of handwriting.  Through the use of handwriting exemplars, 
a government expert testified that Turcks had probably forged the 
signatures of four cardholders.  The jury was then given the 
exemplars to compare with the forged credit slips.  In addition, 
the record reveals that Turcks was present in the video store 
when lost or stolen credit cards were processed and that Turcks 
prepared and signed bank merchant deposits by which Lansdowne 
Video received credit for the fraudulent charges. 
 We are satisfied that the government produced ample evidence 
that Turcks was intimately involved in the fraudulent scheme.  In 
light of this record, we conclude that it is highly unlikely that 
the jury convicted Turcks of the substantive offenses solely on 
the basis of the erroneous Pinkerton charge.  Because we conclude 
that Turcks cannot show that the charge, in the manner given, 
affected Turcks' conviction on the substantive charges, we may 
not consider whether to exercise our discretion.  We therefore 
hold that the erroneous instruction did not constitute "plain 
error."  
 
  
III 
 Turcks next argues that the nine counts of credit card fraud 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) merge into one count under the 
statute.  He did not raise this objection in the district court 
and so we again review for "plain error."  We reject Turcks' 
argument. 
 Turcks' argument is based on the language of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1029(a)(2) which reads as follows: 
(a) Whoever-- 
 
  (2) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics in 
or uses one or more unauthorized access devices 
during any one-year period, and by such conduct 
obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more 
during that period; 
 
shall if the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce, 
be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. 
 
 Turcks contends that because the statute applies to the use 
of "one or more unauthorized devices . . . aggregating $1,000 or 
more" during a one-year period, the government may only convict 
him of one offense no matter how many credit cards or how much 
"value" over $1,000 was obtained by him.  He argues, in the 
alternative, that either the statutory language plainly permits 
only one conviction or that the rule of lenity requires that we 
construe the statute in his favor to permit only one conviction.7 
                     
7
.  Turcks claims in his brief on appeal that all of the illegal 
uses of the credit cards constitute a single aggravated offense 
and therefore Counts Two through Ten should have merged for 
purposes of sentencing.  He claims that the sentences imposed on 
Counts Three through Ten should be vacated and the separate 
Special Assessments on those Counts abated (Brief of Appellant p. 
13).  At oral argument, Turcks' counsel acknowledged that 
pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Turcks' sentence on the 
  
 When read in the context of its legislative history, we hold 
that the statute permits multiple prosecutions whenever the 
defendant's course of conduct exceeds the relevant jurisdictional 
minima.  Section 1029's predecessor was the Truth in Lending Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1644(a).8  H. Rep. No. 98-894, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 
reprinted in 1984 U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3691.  Prior to 
the enactment of § 1029, § 1644 was the principal federal statute 
used to prosecute credit card fraud.  A reading of the two 
statutes demonstrates their similarity.  Section 1644 punishes: 
Whoever knowingly . . . uses . . . any . . . 
fraudulently obtained credit card to obtain 
. . . anything else of value which within any one-year 
period has a value aggregating $1,000 or more. 
 
Section 1029(a)(2) punishes: 
Whoever knowingly and with intent to defraud . . . uses 
one or more unauthorized access devices during any one-
year period, and . . . obtains anything of value 
aggregating $1,000 or more. 
 
(..continued) 
substantive counts would have been the same had the counts merged 
because the Guidelines compute the sentence based on the total 
monies lost not on the total number of counts charged.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1.  We therefore understand that the only 
additional penalties imposed on Turcks as a result of Turcks 
having been charged with nine counts were the eight additional 
Special Assessments of fifty dollars for each additional count. 
8
.  15 U.S.C. § 1644(a) provides as follows: 
 
Whoever knowingly in a transaction affecting interstate 
or foreign commerce, uses or attempts or conspires to 
use any counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost, 
stolen, or fraudulently obtained credit card to obtain 
money, goods, services, or anything else of value which 
within any one-year period has a value aggregating 
$1,000 or more . . . . shall be fined not more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 
  
 With the exception of the phrase "one or more unauthorized 
access devices" found in § 1029(a)(2), the statutes are virtually 
identical.9  Hence, judicial interpretation of the Truth in 
Lending Act (§ 1644) provides instruction for the interpretation 
of the access device fraud act (§ 1029) with which we are 
concerned here. 
 As we read the legislative history regarding the progression 
from the Truth in Lending Act to the access device fraud act and 
as we understand the cases decided under the Truth in Lending 
Act,10 it is evident that Congress intended by the passage of 
§ 1029 to combat a dramatic increase in credit card fraud.  S. 
Rep. No. 98-368, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 & H. Rep. No. 98-894, 
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & 
                     
9
.  In one Congressional committee report, the committee noted 
that the $1,000 or more requirement "conforms with the threshold 
for certain offenses under the Truth in Lending Act."  H. Rep. 
98-984, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1984 U. S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News 3703. 
10
.  Those courts which have interpreted the Truth in Lending Act 
(§ 1644) have interpreted the term "$1,000 or more" and the term 
"one year period," which appear in both § 1644 and § 1029, to 
permit more than one conviction each time the defendant's 
fraudulent conduct resulted in a gain which equaled or exceeded 
$1,000 in a one year period.  United States v. Abod, 770 F.2d 
1293, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting defendant's argument 
that he could not be convicted of three counts for using the same 
card to obtain over $3,000 in value); United States v. Mikelberg, 
517 F.2d 246, 252 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting defendant's 
contention that the government could not aggregate multiple 
transactions to meet the jurisdictional requirement), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 909 (1976); see also United States v. Helgesen, 
669 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1982) (accepting multiple convictions 
without discussion), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982).  These 
cases which interpret the term "$1,000 or more" in § 1644 to 
permit multiple convictions are thus instructive of the proper 
interpretation of the term "one or more" in § 1029(a)(2). 
  
Admin. News 3648, 3691-92.  In particular, Congress added the 
phrase "one or more unauthorized access devices" in § 1029(a)(2) 
to close a loophole that appeared in § 1644.  The Truth in 
Lending Act (§ 1644) had required that $1,000 fraudulently be 
obtained by the use of each individual card.  Thus, the Act was 
not violated if ten individual cards were used to defraud each 
true owner of $900 per card, even though the total thus acquired 
by the defrauder was $9,000, an amount which exceeded the $1,000 
threshold.   
 The legislative history of § 1029 reveals that criminal 
syndicates were therefore using unauthorized credit cards to 
charge just up to, but not beyond, the jurisdictional amount.  
Id.  By inserting the "one or more" language in § 1029, Congress 
enabled the federal government to prosecute these crime rings.  
Id at 3691.  Although the specific legislative action enabled 
prosecutors to aggregated unauthorized uses, we glean no 
indication from the legislative history that Congress intended 
that the "one or more" language used in § 1029 limit the 
government's ability to charge violators with more than one 
count.  Indeed, the insertion of the "one or more" language 
evidences Congress' intent to buttress enforcement of § 1029, an 
intent that would be betrayed by a reading that allowed charging 
on only one count in any one-year period. 
 We are not persuaded by Turcks that a major offender who 
uses hundreds of stolen credit cards to obtain millions of 
dollars may be charged with only one count of violating 
§ 1029(a)(2), yet that is the conclusion we would have to draw 
  
from Turcks' interpretation and reading of § 1029(a)(2).  In 
holding otherwise, we join those courts which have earlier 
considered this question and held, as we hold now, that separate 
violations of § 1029 whereby $1,000 or more is acquired in a one-
year period, using one or more credit cards, may be charged in 
multiple counts.  United States v. Iredia, 866 F.2d 114, 120 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989); United States v. 
Newman, 701 F. Supp. 184, 186-87 (D. Nev. 1988); see also United 
States v. Powell, 973 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming a 
multiple count conviction without comment), cert. denied, 113 S. 
Ct. 1598 (1993); United States v. Ryan, 894 F.2d 355 (10th Cir. 
1990) (same).  This conclusion is consistent with the 
Congressional purpose in enacting § 1029. 
 Finally, we observe that our holding does not run afoul of 
the rule of lenity.  The rule of lenity "demands resolution of 
ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant."  
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990).  It operates 
"only after it is determined that a criminal statute is 
ambiguous, not at the beginning of the process of construction, 
'as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.'" 
United States v. Rodriguez, 961 F.2d 1089, 1093-94 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)).  It 
"is not to be applied where to do so would conflict with the 
implied or expressed intent of Congress."  Liparota v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985).  If we were to adopt Turcks' 
reading of § 1029, our holding would conflict with Congress' 
intent.  Thus, the rule has no application here. 
  
 
IV 
 Turcks finally contends that the district court failed to 
make the requisite factual findings to justify the restitution 
order.  While we review for "plain error" because Turcks did not 
object, we will reverse and remand for resentencing because the 
district court failed to comply with our express statement that 
such findings are essential for our review, thus prejudicing 
Turcks.  Indeed, the government has conceded that resentencing 
must take place.11 
 The district court ordered restitution pursuant to the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663-64, which 
provides in § 3664: 
The court, in determining whether to order restitution 
under section 3663 of this title and the amount of such 
restitution, shall consider the amount of the loss 
sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the 
financial resources of the defendant, the financial 
needs and earning ability of the defendant and the 
defendant's dependents, and such other factors as the 
court deems appropriate. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (emphasis added).  Consistent with the 
statute's mandate, we require that district courts make 
particular factual findings prior to ordering restitution.  
United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 549 (3d Cir.), cert. 
                     
11
.  The government's brief recites, "The district court 
incorrectly imposed an order of restitution upon Turcks without 
making a finding on ability to pay and the case should be 
remanded for resentencing.  The government agrees with Turcks 
that this case should be remanded for the district court to make 
findings on Turcks' ability to pay the restitution."  (Brief of 
the Appellee p. 16). 
  
denied, 1994 WL 466503 (Nov. 7, 1994); United States v. Logar, 
975 F.2d 958, 961 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Palma, 760 
F.2d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 1985).  Specifically, the district court 
must make factual findings based on the record of: 
1) the amount of loss, 2) the defendant's ability to 
pay and the financial need of the defendant and the 
defendant's dependents, and 3) the relationship between 
the restitution imposed and the loss caused by the 
defendant's conduct.  We also [hold] that, 
notwithstanding estimates of loss in a presentence 
report, the district court judge must point to the 
evidence in the record supporting the calculation of 
loss to the victims. 
 
Copple, 24 F.3d at 549-50 (citing Logar, 975 F.2d at 961-62). 
 At the sentencing hearing, the district court orally ordered 
Turcks to pay $102,137.99.  No findings were made.  Among other 
things, the district court failed to find to whom the payments 
should be made, and in what amount, and failed to make any 
finding regarding Turcks' ability to pay.  These omissions amount 
to clear error. 
 Turcks also contends, citing United States v. Hughey, 495 
U.S. 411 (1990), that the district court erred by assigning all 
of the restitution he was ordered to pay to Count Two despite the 
fact that the total amount that Turcks obtained through use of 
the credit cards was the subject of nineteen convictions.  Hughey 
involved a defendant who pled guilty only to Count Four of a six 
count indictment but was ordered to pay restitution for losses 
that resulted from relevant conduct as to which he did not plead 
guilty.  Id. at 413-14.  The Supreme Court held that Hughey could 
  
only be ordered to pay restitution for the conduct charged in 
Count Four.  Id. at 422.12 
 The jury convicted Turcks on all nineteen counts in the 
indictment.  He has not alleged that the restitution award was 
derived from conduct that was not charged in a count in the 
indictment.  Accordingly, Hughey does not apply to Turcks' 
situation. 
 With regard to the restitution award, Turcks has met his 
burden of showing prejudice.  After the sentencing hearing, the 
$102,137.99 restitution figure, which the district court 
announced orally at sentencing, was reduced to $85,835.99 in the 
subsequently entered written judgment based on further 
calculations by the probation department.  Turcks has called our 
attention to the district court's uncertainty as to his ability 
to pay.  The district court ordered Turcks to pay the restitution 
award starting immediately (Turcks was sentenced on March 4, 
1993) but stated that he need only pay the $950 in Special 
                     
12
.  Since Hughey was filed, Congress enacted legislation 
addressing the rule of Hughey.  That legislation has no relevance 
here where Turcks' did not plead guilty but was convicted on all 
counts of the indictment.  Pub. L. No. 101-647, tit. XXV § 2509, 
tit. XXXV § 3595 (1990).  One amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3663 
permits a court to order restitution for conduct to which the 
defendant did not plead guilty "to the extent agreed to by the 
parties in a plea agreement."  18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3); see United 
States v. Jewett, 978 F.2d 248, 253 (6th Cir. 1992).  The second 
amendment defines "victim" under crimes involving a pattern of 
criminal activity as "any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme."  18 
U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2); see Jewett, 978 F.2d at 252.  As we later 
hold in text, because the jury convicted Turcks of every offense 
with which the government charged him, neither Hughey nor the 
recent legislative amendments are applicable here. 
  
Assessments "as soon as Mr. Turcks can do so."  App. 70a.  This 
circumstance, the discrepancy in the restitution ordered, and the 
failure to make other required factual findings cause us to 
conclude that Turcks' sentence was prejudicially affected by the 
district court's restitution order. 
 We are vested with discretion in concluding that "plain 
error" occurred.  Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1778.  Here it is evident 
that the district court's failure to comply with our requirements 
of fact-finding seriously affected Turcks' sentence in as far as 
the restitution order is concerned.  It may be that on remand, 
when the district court makes the findings that are mandated by 
our precedents, the district court may determine that the same 
restitution heretofore imposed on Turcks should be reimposed, 
providing that the facts found support such an order.  On the 
other hand, the findings which the district court makes may lead 
to a different restitution order.  It will be for the district 
court to resentence in its discretion based on the findings which 
it makes.  In this respect, the district court may desire to take 
additional testimony or it may, it if deems the record 
sufficient, make such findings from the record as it now exists. 
 
  
V 
 Thus, we affirm Turcks' conviction on the nineteen counts in 
the indictment.  We will reverse and remand for a redetermination 
of the restitution order in a manner consistent with this 
opinion. 
